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Abstract
This paper briey examines the eectiveness of photo radar, or the use of automatic camera-
equipped trac monitoring devices, in reducing road fatalities and collisions. Photo radar
has become a controversial subject among the driving public, largely due to its tendency to
produce substantially increased revenues for the implementing governments. From the road
safety literature, there appears to be a causal link between driving at excessive speeds and
trac accidents (and fatalities). Photo radar is designed to reduce speeding by increasing
the likelihood of catching those drivers over some predetermined speed threshold, but can
be limited in certain circumstances by the inability to identify the driver. A simplied
driver-choice model is provided to demonstrate the eects of photo radar on speeding when
the driver can be identied (and demerit points applied) and when the vehicle owner is
applied a monetary ne alone. Raw data from Victoria, Australia, suggest that photo radar
has signicantly reduced both fatalities and collisions after its introduction in 1990, and
controlling for other factors, including proxies for weather conditions and drunken driving,
we nd that photo radar can indeed be an eective road safety device.
JEL Classications: R49, D0, C51
Keywords: Road safety, speeding, enforcement.
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In response to declining police budgets and rising trac fatalities and accidents, gov-
ernments have become increasingly concerned with new methods of promoting road safety,
including the use of camera-equipped radar devices, commonly known as photo radar. Photo
radar rst appeared in Europe more than twenty years ago (in Switzerland and Germany),
but has since spread across the globe to over forty-ve countries. The issue is of particular
importance in Canada, where photo radar has been in place for years in Calgary and Ed-
monton, has new programs arising in Lethbridge, Winnipeg and British Columbia, and was
briey experimented with in Ontario in late 1994 and early 1995. Although photo radar
systems are often costly to implement, it has proven to be a substantial money-maker, a
fact that has drawn criticism from those who believe that road safety is less of a concern to
governments than the revenues generated. Previous analyses of the eectiveness of photo
radar have pointed to trends and other informal methods. In this paper, we develop a
general model of the driver's decision to speed or comply with speed limits in order to ana-
lyze the eect of driver heterogeneity in income on speeding, and evaluate the incentives of
photo radar relative to traditional enforcement incentives. Data from Victoria, Australia,
where photo radar has been employed since 1990, are used to test whether the presence of
photo radar can generate signicant reductions in both trac collisions and fatalities.
The commonly held view is that increases in speed cause more accidents (i.e. speed kills).
Solomon (1964), Cirillo (1968), Lave (1985) and others have noted that the relationship
between average speed and trac accidents or fatalities is weak, although the variance of
speed (or speed dierential from the limit or mean) is inuential.1 In all of the regressions
performed by Lave, the coecient on average speed is found to be statistically insignicant,
suggesting that, \once the eect of variance is held constant, there is no discernible eect of
speed on the fatality rate." However, speed variance is positively and signicantly related
to fatalities, implying that both the fastest and slowest drivers cause accidents. Follow-
up studies by Levy and Asch (1989), Snyder (1989), Fowles and Loeb (1989), Bowie and
Waltz (1993), Jorgensen and Polak (1993), and Kloeden et al. (1997) using dierent data
1For Lave, speed variance is measured by the 85th percentile of average speed less the average speed, or
approximately one standard deviation.
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sets, conrm that speed variance has a noticeable eect on fatalities, although (contrary
to Lave) each of these studies also nds a signicant relationship between average speed
and fatalities. McKnight, Klein and Tippetts (1990), Garber and Graham (1990), Stre
and Schultz (1991), and Lave and Elias (1994) have shown signicant increases in injuries
and/or fatalities when speed limits were increased. Photo radar, if eective in reducing the
numbers of speeders and the extent to which each individual exceeds the limit, would impact
on both the average speed and speed variance, by shifting downward only the distribution
of speeders above the limit. In the following section, a simple model od driver-choice is
presented in which the incentives of photo radar can be examined. Previous theoretical
studies of this manner, such as Graves, Lee and Sexton (1989, 1993) and Rodriguez (1990),
are primarily concerned with the optimality of speed limits and punishments. This paper
analyzes the eectiveness of speed enforcement which requires a model of private, and not
social, choice. Empirical results are outlined in section 2, and concluding remarks and
recommendations are provided in section 3.
1 Incentives, Punishment and Speed Enforcement
Any law meant to deter criminal activity must provide incentives to conform to the law, or
equally, proper disincentives to break it. In regard to speed enforcement, this is typically
achieved through nes or license suspensions, or some combination of the two, and to be
eective, the expected punishment must be no smaller than the benet a driver derives from
speeding.2 The value of the reduced travel time is presumably the benet to drivers. As
the value of a driver's time, normally measured by or proportionate to that person's wage,
varies across drivers, the ne must also vary across drivers for eective deterrence. However,
it is generally considered unjust to set nes according to income, and as a result, nes are
typically xed across individuals (although the punishment may be an increasing function of
2This, of course, assumes risk-neutral or risk-averse drivers. We assume that the probability of getting into
an accident is independent of the probabilty of being caught speeding. While the probability of getting into
an accident is increasing in speed, the functional form is the same under both photo radar and conventional
speed enforcement, and thus is ignored in the theoretical model. Through this assumption, the question of
valuing the cost of an accident or fatality is circumvented, and benets become certain and not expected.
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the extent of the violation). Even without income discrimination, speeding can be deterred
for all individuals through very high nes. Again, social and political pressures may set
constraints on nes below the level necessary to discourage the highest income drivers from
speeding, and thus, nes alone would be insucient to prevent speeding. This bias towards
high income drivers can be oset through the identication and reporting of drivers to
insurance companies, as well as through the frequently utilized \demerit point" system.
In addition to higher insurance premiums, driver oenses can be assigned demerit points,
again increasingly with the extent of the speeding, which provide a dierent, and potentially
more powerful, type of punishment: the eventual loss of the driver's license if the points
accumulated exceed some predetermined threshold, which would then result in signicantly
increased travel times. While a ne may have more of an eect on individuals who have
low incomes than on those with high incomes, demerit points have the advantage of being
implicitly progressive. Just as the benet from speeding is higher for high-income persons,
the benet of holding a driver's license may also be greater, as the inconvenience derived
from public transportation may be higher. By assigning demerit points, the government can
circumvent the problem of not being able to raise nes high enough to deter high-income
drivers.
Speeding is thus a risky action for a driver. If caught, he or she incurs a ne, increasing
in the speed deviation from the limit, S, as well as higher insurance rates, the extent of
which, for simplicity, depends on the demerit points accumulated, D(S), also increasing in
S, where 0    1 is a scaling parameter that signies the extent to which demerit points
are imposed. Under the assumption of utility of expected value maximizing behaviour (or
equivalently, risk neutrality), the driver's objective is
max
<X;L>
U(X;L); (1)
where X represents the consumption level of a composite commodity, and L that of leisure
time, subject to the expected income constraint
wH = PX + I + F (S) + I(D(S)); (2)
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where w is the wage rate, H is the time spent working, P is the price of X, F (S) is the
ne,  is the probability of being caught,3 and I and I(D(S)) are the xed and variable
components of the insurance cost, respectively, and the time constraint
T = L+H + R R(S); (3)
where T is the total time endowment, R is the time spent if he or she drives at the speed
limit, and R(S) represents the reduction in driving time as an increasing function of S. Upon
substitution of L from (3) into (1), with H given by (2), the driver's utility maximizing
choices of X and S must then satisfy
U1(X;L)
P
=
U2(X;L)
w
; (4)
and
w
P
R0(S) = [F 0(S) + I 0(D(S))D0(S)]; (5)
respectively.4 Equation (4) is the standard result that, in equilibrium, the marginal utility
of leisure relative to its marginal cost, w, has to be equal to the marginal utility of the
consumption of X relative to its marginal cost, P ;in another way, leisure is consumed up
to the point where the (expected) utility received from an additional unit of leisure relative
to the income sacriced (the wage) from that additional unit is equal to the (expected)
utility received from an additional unit of the composite commodity relative to the cost of
that unit (the price). Equation (5) states that the marginal benet of speeding equals the
marginal cost. Thus, a driver increases his or her speed until the additional benet from
speeding, which is the real income potentially earned from the reduced driving time (the
real wage multiplied by the time gained), is just equal to the expected loss from the ne
and added insurance cost (expected premium increase).
3For a xed enforcement budget, the probability of being caught speeding can be considered constant and
independent of the extent of the violation. Furthermore, it is assumed that a driver caught driving above
the limit is inevitably convicted.
4The interior solution described by equations (5) and (6) represents a maximum, as the Hessian is negative
semi-denite. The assumptions made are: U1 > 0, U2 > 0, U11  0, U22  0, U12 = U21 > 0, R0 > 0,
R00 < 0, F 0 > 0, F 00 > 0, D0 > 0, D00 > 0, I 0 > 0, and I 00 > 0. Strict concavity or convexity is assumed for
simplicity only.
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One can note that an increase in the income of an individual serves to increase the
extent to which he or she speeds, by raising the marginal benet of speeding:
dS
dw
=
R0(S)
PF 00(S) + 2PfI 00(D(S))[D0(S)]2 + I 0(D(S))D00(S)g   wR00(S) > 0: (6)
As mentioned above, a ne that is a function of the wage would allow the marginal cost
of speeding to increase along with the marginal benet. However, when the ne does not
vary with the wage of the individual, the added income from the reduced travel time from
speeding is greater, the higher the wage. This makes the ne less eective in reducing speeds,
and should result in higher income individuals driving faster than lower income individuals.
Cellular telephones and other recent technologies allow some work to be performed on the
road, which could reduce the income impacts on speeding.
Under a trac camera system, analysis of the other deterrence method, demerit points,
becomes more complicated, as the owner of the vehicle, and not the driver, receives the
ticket. Conventional speed traps can unequivocally identify the driver of the vehicle at the
time of the infraction, while photo radar cannot.5 In some cases, this inability to discern
the driver has caused governments to eliminate the demerit points applied to photo radar
oenses.6 In the above model, the absence of demerit points reduces the expected marginal
cost associated with speeding, the additional expected insurance cost, which results in a
higher speed for all drivers, independently of their income. But even without demerit
points, photo radar can be more eective than conventional enforcement through higher
productivity, as shown by the far greater numbers of tickets given by photo radar than
otherwise possible, which signicantly increases the probability of being caught. In fact, in
the above model, photo radar is eective (that is, resulting in lower speeds) in this situation
5The cameras could be equipped with a polarizing lter to eliminate windshield glare and identify the
driver. However, this is sometimes considered an invasion of privacy and is generally avoided.
6For example, Ontario did not apply demerit points to infractions caught by photo radar during its 1995-
96 employment of the system, although points were appied to speed oenses caught through conventional
means during the same period. However, this problem has been circumvented in other areas by applying
the demerit points to the owner of the vehicle unless he or she legally swears another person was driving
the vehicle at the time of the oence, in which case the identied driver becomes liable (as is the case in
Victoria, Australia).
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if
d >  
(
SI 00(D(S))[D0(S)]2 + SI 0(D(S))D00(S)
F 0(S) + I 0(D(S))D0(S)
)
d; (7)
that is, if the increase in the probability of being caught speeding is greater than the
expected change in the marginal insurance cost of speeding as a percentage of the total
marginal cost of speeding brought about by the decrease in the extent to which demerit
points can be imposed. With  equal to unity under conventional enforcement, and to zero
under photo radar, (7) reduces to
R   C
C
>
SI 00(D(S))[D0(S)]2 + SI 0(D(S))D00(S)
F 0(S) + I 0(D(S))D0(S)
; (8)
where C is the probability of being caught by conventional speed enforcement methods, R
is the probability of being caught by photo radar, so that the left-hand-side of (8) represents
the percentage change in the probability of being caught induced by the switch to photo
radar.
Overall, it would then seem that a photo radar system should be eective in reducing
trac speeds if demerit points are applied to these oences, and possibly eective if demerit
points cannot be imposed. The previously mentioned studies suggest that a policy which
reduces speeds and/or speed variance should also reduce the numbers of trac accidents
and fatalities. The following section empirically tests the hypothesis that photo radar is
eective when demerit points are utilized, as in Victoria, Australia.
2 Data, Methodology and Regression Results
The results of this section are based on aggregated monthly data from the state of Victoria,
Australia, for the period from January, 1986 to December, 1995. Trac fatalities, accidents
and camera hours were obtained from the Trac Camera Oce of the Victoria Police, the
numbers of licensed drivers from VicRoads, alcohol related collisions from the Monash Uni-
versity Accident Research Centre, and the precipitation gures from the Australian Bureau
of Meteorology. Three observations, during the trial period of photo radar in Victoria in the
months of April, May and June, 1990, are screened out due to insucient data regarding
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camera hours.7 Separate regressions were tted to the data for the dependent variables, fa-
talities per million licensed drivers (FATAL/MLD) and collisions per million licensed drivers
(COLL/MLD).8;9 Accidents and fatalities in the region are provided in Figures 1 and 2.
Photo radar was instituted in Victoria in July of 1990, following record numbers of
collisions in 1988 (53,894, up from 46,711 in 1986) and fatalities in 1990 (777, up from 669
in 1986). In the years from the introduction to the end of 1995, Victoria has experienced
a dramatic decrease in both trac fatalities and collisions, with minimums of 418 in 1995
and 41,307 in 1994, respectively. At the monthly level, fatalities fell from 82 in September
of 1989 to just 17 in September of 1994, and accidents fell from 4874 in May of 1988
to 2999 in January of 1994. The logical question to ask is whether these declines are
a result of the presence of photo radar, or if they are simply coincidence. To answer
such a question, it is obviously necessary to hold the eects of other observable inuences
constant.10 From a perusal of the breakdown of contributing factors of collisions, driver
error is clearly the greatest cause of trac accidents, as can be expected. However, some
observable factors play a prominent role, particularly driving while under the inuence of
alcohol and weather/road conditions. Thus, both collisions involving alcohol per million
licensed drivers, ALC/MLD, as a proxy for drunken drivers, and average precipitation,
PRECIP,11 are included as independent variables in the regressions of a priori grounds.
To test the inuence of photo radar, hours of camera operation, HOURS, and the square
of camera hours, HRSSQ (to account for the expected diminishing returns to additional
camera hours), are also included. TIME is included to eliminate any time trend in the data
7Standard missing variable interpolation techniques, including the cubic spline, linear and step methods,
were tried with little impact on the results and conclusions. Given the nature of the trial period, it is not
unreasonable to assume that none of these methods would accurately reect the camera hours during the
missing three months, and therefore the results omitting these observations are presented.
8The determinants of collisions and fatalities may dier because of changes in automobile safety standards
and devices (such as anti-lock brakes and airbags).
9Income, a variable possibly inuencing speeding and accidents at the individual level but relatively
constant and thus inappropriate at the aggregate level, is not included in the regressions.
10As data on conventional enforcement eorts are not available, it is reasonably assumed that these eorts
remained constant with the introduction of photo radar.
11Average precipitation was calculated from the precipitation measures of a cross-section of fteen weather
stations across Victoria.
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that is independent of the presence of photo radar or other included variables.12 Summary
statistics for the dependent and independent variables are provided in Table 1.
The two equations estimated are
FATAL
MLD
= 0 + 1
ALC
MLD
+ 2HOURS + 3HRSSQ+ 4PRECIP + 5TIME (9)
and
COLL
MLD
= 0 + 1
ALC
MLD
+ 2HOURS + 3HRSSQ+ 4PRECIP + 5TIME: (10)
If photo radar is eective in reducing fatalities and collisions (but at a diminishing rate),
2 and 2 are expected to have a signicantly negative sign (and 3 and 3 a signicantly
positive sign). If photo radar is ineective, these signs will be zero. To reiterate, more
drunken drivers (approximated by alcohol related collisions) and less ideal driving conditions
(more precipitation) each cause greater numbers of trac accidents, so that the signs of 1
and 1, and 4 and 4, respectively, are expected to be positive. There is no expectation
associated with the signs of the time trend coecients 5 and 5.
VARIABLE PRE-RADAR POST-RADAR ENTIRE SAMPLE
MEAN MEAN MEAN
(VARIANCE) (VARIANCE) (VARIANCE)
FATAL/MLD 23:01(16:27) 12:69(8:37) 17:19(38:15)
COLL/MLD 1633:4(48911) 1234:0(7520) 1408:1(64858)
ALC/MLD 49:68(228:37) 29:87(39:09) 38:50(217:72)
HOURS NA 3384:9(0:13  107) NA
PRECIP 61:29(851:65) 67:16(1205:1) 64:6(1050:9)
Table 1. Summary statistics. NA - not applicable.
The results of the estimation of (9) and (10) are shown in Table 2.13 In each regression,
the coecients on alcohol related collisions, camera hours, and the square of camera hours
12Although wealth is included in the above theoretical analysis, it is omitted in the empirical tests because
of the use of aggregated data.
13Testing suggests no autocorrelation of the error terms, as would be expected in such an examination,
and analysis of the standardized residuals and Cook's distances from each regression suggests no excessive
inuence of any particular observation. Further, no structural change at the implementation of photo radar
(by Chow test) and an acceptable coecient of variation (CV) for each regression suggest reasonably reliable
predictions.
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have the expected sign and are statistically signicant at the 5 percent level, implying that
increases in drunken driving increase the numbers of both collisions and fatalities, and more
camera hours reduce these numbers but at a diminishing rate (that is, photo radar is eective
in reducing both collisions and fatalities). The coecient on precipitation is statistically
signicant in the collisions regression, but is insignicant in the fatalities regression. Thus,
additional precipitation increases the number of collisions, but not fatalities. This may
suggest that drivers drive more carefully in rain or snow, but slick roads cause more \minor"
accidents. From these results, it would not be inappropriate to conclude that photo radar is
an eective alternative to conventional speed enforcement procedures. By eliminating the
eects of other observable inuences on trac fatalities and collisions, the premise that the
reductions in these measures are purely coincidental can be rejected.
FATAL/MLD COLL/MLD
ALC/MLD 0:1203(3:43) 7:6546(5:10)
HOURS  0:0030( 2:22)  0:1241( 2:15)
HRSSQ 0:0000005(2:24) 0:00003(2:94)
PRECIP  0:0067( 0:71) 1:2030(2:99)
TIME  0:06446( 2:42)  3:1940( 2:74)
CONSTANT 19:007(11:92) 1258:3(18:43)
Adjusted R2 0:7251 0:7036
Table 2. Regressions results, t-statistics in parentheses.
 denotes signicance at the 5% level,  at the 1% level.
3 Concluding Remarks
Despite widespread use of trac speed cameras, or photo radar, around the world, such a
system is often criticized for being a \cash-cow" rather than a road safety device. An analysis
of the incentives provided by such a system suggests that photo radar may have a positive
or negative eect on road safety, depending on the presence or absence of demerit points
in respect to oences caught by photo radar cameras, assuming that there exists a direct,
signicant relationship between speeds (or speed variance) and collisions and fatalities. This
follows from the fact that, after the initial start-up costs, one photo radar van can give out
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tickets at a much faster and more cost-eective rate than one police cruiser, stopping more
speeders while generating far more revenues at the same time (not unimportant in the face
of declining budgets). A negative impact may arise without demerit points as a higher
probability of being caught and a ne alone may not be as eective at deterring drivers as a
lower probability, ne and demerit points. Through empirical testing, photo radar is shown
to reduce trac fatalities, injuries and collisions in the situation where demerit points are
applied to speeding oences. Future empirical analysis can examine the eectiveness of
photo radar in a jurisdiction which employs photo radar without the imposition of demerit
points.
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